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general equilibrium models predict the opposite. We show that a standard real
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rationalize the crowding-in effect documented in the VAR literature. When
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1. Introduction
Recent empirical evidence based on vector autoregressions (VARs) seems to support
the traditional Keynesian idea that public spending crowds in private consumption.
One of the first studies in this area is by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). They used
post-war U.S. data and found that an increase in public spending leads to a large
and significant increase in consumption, output and the real wage, and to a decrease
in private investment spending. The responses of consumption, output and the real
wage are strong, statistically significant, and hump shaped. While the increase in out-
put is consistent with both neoclassical and standard Keynesian models, the increase
in private consumption and the real wage contradicts standard neoclassical models.
To identify fiscal spending shocks, Blanchard and Perotti exploit institutional infor-
mation about the timing of tax collection to compute (and purge) the automatic
responses of tax and fiscal spending. Fata´s and Mihov (2001) and Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido
and Valle´s (2007) also use U.S. data but rely on a purely recursive identification
scheme to isolate exogenous changes in public spending. They also find a positive ef-
fect of government spending shocks on consumption. Perotti (2005, 2007) extends the
empirical study of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to the United Kingdom, Germany,
Canada and Australia and finds similar results. Mountford and Uhlig (2005) use U.S.
data from 1955 to 2000 and the same definitions as in Blanchard and Perotti, but
achieve identification by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse response functions.
Many of their results are similar to those of Blanchard and Perotti, but the response
of private consumption to an increase in fiscal spending is small, although positive
and statistically significant on impact.
The question is whether these results undermine modern dynamic general equilib-
rium models, including both real business cycle (RBC) and New Keynesian models,
in which changes in public spending crowd out private consumption due to a negative
wealth effect (see Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992 and Baxter and King,
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1993).1 In this paper, we argue that this is not necessarily the case. In particular, we
show that the crowding-in effect documented in the empirical literature can be ratio-
nalized within an RBC-neoclassical model in which public spending is set optimally
by a benevolent government. The latter assumption is consistent with the underly-
ing philosophy of the RBC approach, which emphasizes building models in which all
agents optimize well-defined objective functions subject to technological and budget
constraints. In our model, fiscal spending, which consists of public consumption and
investment expenditures, reacts endogenously to stochastic shocks affecting prefer-
ences and technology. We show that when such a model is used as a data-generating
process, a VAR estimated using the artificial data yields, upon imposing the com-
monly used identifying restrictions, a positive consumption response to an increase
in public spending. As found in the empirical literature, the increase is persistent
and hump shaped. Interestingly, this result holds whether private consumption and
fiscal spending are substitutes or complements. These findings suggest that the iden-
tification schemes employed in the VAR literature may not be informative about the
underlying model when fiscal spending is set optimally and is fundamentally endoge-
nous.
A few alternative explanations have been proposed to account for the crowding-in
effect of fiscal spending. Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido and Valle´s (2007) set up a New Keynesian
model in which a fraction of consumers are constrained to consume their current dis-
posable income in each period, and households are willing to meet the firms’ demand
for labor at the wage rate set by a union. Provided the fraction of non-Ricardian con-
sumers is large enough, the model can generate a positive response of consumption to
a government spending shock. Bouakez and Rebei (2007) show that the RBC model
can generate a crowding-in effect when preferences exhibit strong Edgeworth comple-
mentarity between public and private spending. Linnemann (2005) obtains the same
result with a non-additively separable utility function and a small intertemporal elas-
1Basu and Kimball (2005) showed that in a New Keynesian model with sticky prices, the negative
wealth effect of an increase in public spending on consumption is so strong that output also declines.
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ticity of substitution. In contrast to these contributions where public expenditures
are assumed to be exogenous, our approach rationalizes the crowding-in effect on the
ground that public spending is endogenously determined and covaries positively with
private consumption in response to structural shocks.
The paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we describe the model
and relate it to the existing literature. In the third section, we discuss the model’s
steady-state properties and its calibration. We present and discuss our results in the
fourth section. The fifth section concludes.
2. Model
We model endogenous public spending following Ambler and Cardia (1997). A benev-
olent government chooses public spending to maximize the welfare of the represen-
tative private agent. Kydland and Prescott (1977) showed that optimal government
policies are subject to a time inconsistency problem. In our model, the government
cannot precommit to its announced policies for public consumption and public invest-
ment spending.2 We use dynamic programming methods to derive time-consistent
policies. Private agents and the government have reaction functions that depend on
the current state of the economy (so-called Markov strategies). Macroeconomic equi-
librium in our model is Markov-perfect. Public spending is financed by proportional
taxes on labor and capital income. Distortionary taxes balance the budget on aver-
age. Any discrepancy in the short run is made up by lump sum taxes and transfers.
2Most of the existing models in which the behavior of government is endogenized allow the
government to precommit to its policies. Chamley (1986), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991,
1995), and Lansing (1998) used the framework first developed by Ramsey (1927) to consider optimal
taxation with precommitment. The existing literature on optimal time-consistent fiscal policies
is more sparse. Blanchard and Fischer (1989) contains a textbook discussion comparing optimal
policies with and without precommitment on the part of the government. Fischer (1980) compared
the levels of welfare that can be attained with and without precommitment in a simple model. Lucas
and Stokey (1983) studied how the government can issue nominal debt contracts which make its
optimal taxation plans time consistent. Chari and Kehoe (1992) analyzed how trigger strategies
can be used as a credible means of enforcing precommitment. Ortigueira (2005) studied optimal
Markov-perfect strategies for financing an exogenous stream of government spending.
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Because of distortionary taxation, the first-best optimum is not attainable.3
2.1 Households
There is a representative private household that values consumption and leisure. Its
utility function is given by:
Ut = Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
{
ln (c˜t+i)−
γt
1 + ψ
n1+ψt+i
}
, (1)
where Et is the mathematical expectations operator conditional on information avail-
able at time t, β is a subjective discount factor, c˜t is the household’s total consump-
tion, nt is the number of hours worked by the household, γt is a preference shock, and
ψ ≥ 0 is a preference parameter.
Total consumption is a CES aggregate of private and public consumption expen-
ditures:
c˜t =
(
θc−σt + (1− θ)C
−σ
gt
)
−1/σ
,
where ct is the household’s consumption spending, Cgt is per capita government con-
sumption spending, and the elasticity of substitution between private and public
expenditures is ν ≡ 1/(1 + σ). The CES specification implies that there are dimin-
ishing marginal returns to public spending for a given level of private spending in
order to achieve a given level of total consumption. As shown by Bouakez and Re-
bei (2007), the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution ν has crucial implications
for the comovement between private and public spending when the latter is deter-
mined exogenously. In particular, if the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently low,
government spending can crowd in private consumption.
The household has the flow budget constraint given by:
ct + it ≤ (1− τn)wtnt + (1− τk) qtkt − Tt, (2)
3See Ambler and Desruelle (1991) for more details on this point.
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where τn and τk are, respectively, the labor and capital income tax rates, wt is the
equilibrium real wage rate, qt is the equilibrium capital rental rate, and Tt is the per
capita level of lump-sum taxation.
The household’s holdings of capital evolve according to:
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + it, (3)
where δ is the constant rate of depreciation of private capital.
2.2 Firms
The representative firm uses capital and labor services purchased from households to
produce goods subject to a production function that has constant returns to scale in
private inputs:
Yt = ztNt
αKt
1−αKgt
αg , (4)
where Kgt is the per capita stock of public capital at time t, Kt is the per capita
private capital stock, Nt is the per capita number of hours worked,
4 and zt is an
exogenous stochastic process for the state of technology at time t.
Under perfect competition, factors are be paid their marginal products, so that:
wt = αzt (Kt/Nt)
1−αK
αg
gt , (5)
qt = (1− α) zt (Nt/Kt)
αK
αg
gt . (6)
With constant returns to scale in private inputs, factor payments exhaust output,
there are no rents, and the α parameter can be calibrated in the standard way from
data on labor’s share of total income.5
4We use the convention that when variables appear in both lower and upper case, the lower case
variable is a choice or state variable for the individual household while the upper case variable is the
equivalent aggregate per capita value.
5Note that we do not have endogenous growth in our model. The sum of the coefficients on
reproducible factors in the production function, α+ αg, is less than one in our calibration.
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2.3 Resource Constraints
The economy’s aggregate resource constraint is given by:
Yt ≤ Ct + It + Cgt + Igt, (7)
and the government’s flow budget constraint is given by:
Cgt + Igt = τnwtNt + τkqtKt + Tt, (8)
where Igt is public investment. The laws of motion for the aggregate private and
public stocks of capital are:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (9)
and
Kgt+1 = (1− δg)Kgt + Igt. (10)
2.4 Shock Processes
The technology and preference shocks evolve according to the following stationary
AR(1) processes:
ln (zt) = (1− ρz) ln(z) + ρz ln (zt−1) + ǫzt, (11)
ln (γt) = (1− ργ) ln(γ) + ργ ln (γt−1) + ǫγt, (12)
where ρz and ργ are strictly bounded between −1 and 1, variables without time
subscript denote steady-state values, and ǫzt and ǫγt are normal, uncorrelated white-
noise disturbances with standard deviations σz and σγ respectively.
2.5 The Representative Household’s Problem
The representative household chooses time paths for {nt+i, kt+i+1}
∞
i=0 in order to max-
imize the utility function (1). Given the household’s choice of employment and its
future holdings of capital, its investment expenditures are given by the law of motion
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for capital, and its private consumption expenditures are given by its flow budget
constraint. The household takes as given the wage rate, the rental rate on capital,
the government’s policy rule, and the feedback rule for the per capita equivalents of its
choice variables. The household is aware of the government’s flow budget constraint,
and is able to calculate the level of lump sum taxes necessary to balance its budget.
This problem can be expressed as a stationary discounted dynamic programming
problem. The one-period return function of the household can be written as follows:
rht (Zt, Gt, St, st, Dt, dt) = ln (ct)−
γt
1 + ψ
n1+ψt , (13)
where ct is given by equation (3), where
ct = (1− τnt)wtnt + (1− τkt) qtkt − Tt − kt+1 + (1− δ) kt,
where lump sum taxes are given by the government’s flow budget constraint, and
where
Zt = {zt, γt}
is a vector of state variables which are exogenous from the point of view of the
representative household,
Gt = {Kgt+1, Cgt}
is a vector of government control variables whose laws of motion are also exogenous
from the point of view of the household,
St = {Kgt, Kt}
is a vector of the per capita equivalents of the household’s state variables,
st = {Kgt, kt}
is a vector of the household’s state variables themselves,6
Dt = {Nt, Kt+1}
6Even though the representative household cannot control the evolution of Kgt, the numerical
solution method we use makes it convenient to include Kgt as an element of its state vector.
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is the vector of per capita equivalents of the household’s control variables, and
dt = {nt, kt+1}
are the control variables themselves. The household’s value function can be written
as follows:
vh (Z,G, S, s) = max
d
{
rh (Z,G, S, s,D, d) + βE
[
vh (Z ′, G′, S ′, s′) | Z,G
]}
, (14)
where we have dropped time subscripts, where primes denote next-period values, and
where
Z ′ = A (Z) + ǫ′, (15)
s′ = B (Z,G, S, s,D, d) , (16)
S ′ = B (Z,G, S, S,D,D) , (17)
G = G (Z, S) , (18)
D = D (Z,G, S) . (19)
The household takes as exogenous the government’s feedback rule given by (18):
in equilibrium, this feedback rule must also satisfy the government’s optimality con-
ditions. The solution to the household’s dynamic programming problem gives a feed-
back rule of the form:
d = d (Z,G, S, s) . (20)
2.6 Maximization by the Government
The government chooses time paths for {Cgt+i, Kgt+i+1}
∞
i=0 in order to maximize the
utility of the representative household. Public investment is then given by the law
of motion for the public capital stock, and Tt is determined in order to satisfy the
government’s flow budget constraint. Because taxes are distortionary, the government
cannot attain a first-best optimum. The interaction between the government and the
private sector is not a “team game” problem such as described by Chari, Kehoe and
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Prescott (1989) or Ambler and Desruelle (1981), and the competitive equilibrium
cannot be found as the solution to a social planning problem. The government takes
as given the economy’s resource constraint and the laws of motion for the aggregate
capital stocks. It knows the private sector reaction function given by (20), and it takes
into account the effects of its actions on the private sector. Because of this, it acts
as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the private sector. Because we use dynamic
programming techniques to derive its optimal strategy, the government’s policies are
time-consistent by construction. The government’s one-period return function can be
written as follows:
rg (Zt, St, Dt, Gt) = ln(C˜t)−
γt
1 + ψ
N1+ψt , (21)
with
C˜t =
(
θC−σt + (1− θ)C
−σ
gt
)
−1/σ
,
Ct = Yt − It − Igt − Cgt.
Given this return function, the government’s value function can be written as
vg (Z, S) = max
G
{rg (Z, S,D,G) + βE [vg (Z ′, S ′) | Z]} . (22)
The solution to the government’s problem gives a feedback rule of the same form as
equation (18).
2.7 General Equilibrium
The following conditions must hold in general equilibrium:
• all agents maximize given their constraints;
• the optimal feedback rule for the representative household is compatible with
the feedback rule for the per capita counterparts of its choice variables, so that
d (Z,G, S, S) = D (Z,G, S) ;
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• the law of motion for the government’s control variables that is a constraint
in the representative household’s dynamic programming problem is compatible
with the optimal feedback rule that is the solution to the government’s problem;
• markets clear.
All agents solve dynamic programming problems. Their policy functions depend
on the current state of the economy. General equilibrium in the model can therefore
be characterized as Markov-perfect.
3. Steady State and Calibration
There are no analytical solutions to the optimization problems of the household and
the government. In order to solve the model, we used numerical techniques that are an
extension of those discussed in Hansen and Prescott (1995), and which are described
in more detail in Ambler and Paquet (1994). These techniques involve using the
household’s and the government’s exact first order conditions in order to calculate
the deterministic steady state of the model (the long run equilibrium the economy
would reach in the absence of stochastic shocks), and then calculating quadratic
approximations of the one-period return functions of the household and government
around this steady-state equilibrium. With quadratic return functions, it is well
known that the optimal feedback rules for the household and government are linear,
and that the value functions are themselves quadratic. We can then use simple
iterative techniques to calculate the optimal feedback rules and the value functions.
The steady-state properties of the model were used to calibrate some of its parameters.
The model was calibrated to U.S. quarterly data.
The parameter values used in our base-case simulations are summarized in Table
1. The subjective discount rate, β, the depreciation rates δ and δg, and the share
parameter α were set to standard values from the real business cycle literature. The
tax rates τn and τk were set to 0.197 and 0.303, respectively.
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The first order conditions for the representative household were then used to
calibrate the parameters of the utility function. The first order conditions for the
representative household with respect to its control variables are
∂vh
∂d
=
∂rh
∂d
+ β
∂vh
∂s′
∂s′
∂d
= 0.
Differentiating the value function with respect to the current states s and making use
of the first order conditions gives
∂vh
∂s
=
∂rh
∂s
+ β
∂vh
∂s′
∂s′
∂s
.
In the steady state, this gives
∂vh
∂s
=
∂rh
∂s
(
I − β
∂s′
∂s
)
−1
,
so that the first order conditions for the household in the steady state become
∂r
∂d
+ β
∂rh
∂s
(
I − β
∂s′
∂s
)
−1
∂s′
∂d
= 0. (23)
Applying this equation to our model and imposing the aggregate consistency condi-
tions gives the following equations:
1
C
(1− τn)w − γN
ψ = 0, (24)
β {(1− τk) q + (1− δ)} − 1 = 0. (25)
The last equation gives a solution for the rental rate of capital in the steady state
that depends only on the discount rate, the depreciation rate of capital, and the rate
of taxation on capital income. Given this solution for q, it is possible to solve for the
equilibrium steady-state private capital stock using equation (9), for given values of
N and Kg. Then, for a given level of hours, we can back out the value of γ consistent
with this equilibrium. We calibrated the model so that the average number of hours
per employee N matched its average per capita value in the U.S. data. We chose a
low value for ψ, which increases the variability of total employment.
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The first order conditions for the government can be written as follows:
∂vg
∂G
=
∂rg
∂G
+
∂rg
∂D
∂D
∂G
+ β
∂vg
∂S ′
(
∂S ′
∂G
+
∂S ′
∂D
∂D
∂G
)
= 0,
where ∂D/∂G gives the effects of a change in the government’s control variables on
the behavior of the private sector. Differentiating the government’s value function
with respect to the current states S and using the first order conditions gives
∂vg
∂S
=
∂rg
∂S
+
∂rg
∂D
∂D
∂S
+ β
(
∂vg
∂S ′
∂S ′
∂D
∂D
∂S
+
∂vg
∂S ′
∂S ′
∂S
)
.
At the steady state, this gives
∂vg
∂S
=
(
∂rg
∂S
+
∂rg
∂D
∂D
∂S
)(
I − β
(
∂S ′
∂D
∂D
∂S
+
∂S ′
∂S
))
−1
.
Evaluating the first order conditions at the steady state and substituting this ex-
pression for the partial derivatives of the value function with respect to the states
gives:
∂rg
∂G
+
∂rg
∂D
∂D
∂G
+β
(
∂rg
∂S
+
∂rg
∂D
∂D
∂S
)(
I − β
(
∂S ′
∂D
∂D
∂S
+
∂S ′
∂S
))
−1
·
(
∂S ′
∂G
+
∂S ′
∂D
∂D
∂G
)
= 0. (26)
This gives two equations to solve for the steady-state levels of the government’s con-
trol variables Cgt and Kgt+1, given the solutions for the steady-state levels of the
household’s control variables. Alternatively, the steady-state levels of Cg and Kg can
be imposed, and the first-order conditions can be used to back out values of θ and αg
compatible with these levels.
In practice, these equations are quite complicated to solve. First of all, it is
necessary to evaluate the partial derivatives of the private control variables with
respect to the model’s state variables and with respect to the government’s controls.
This involves either taking total differentials of the household’s first order conditions
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evaluated at the steady state, or solving for the household’s optimal feedback rule,
which necessitates having solved for the steady state of the model.
In order to circumvent these difficulties, we proceeded as follows. We chose values
for Cg and Ig to match the average ratios of current government consumption to
output and of public investment to output from our data set. Then, for given values
of the θ and αg parameters and given steady-state values of Cg and Ig, as well as
a given feedback rule for the government, we solved the model numerically for the
private sector’s optimal feedback rule. We then took this private feedback rule as given
and derived the optimal feedback rule for the government, which gave implied steady-
state values for Cg and Ig. For any discrepancy between the initial and implied values
of the government controls, the θ and αg parameters were adjusted in value, and we
iterated until we arrived at values for θ and αg consistent with the initial postulated
steady-state equilibrium, and until the household’s and government’s value functions
converged.7
The parameters of the stochastic process for zt were calibrated to standard values
from the RBC literature; the value of z is an arbitrary normalization. The parameters
for the preference shock are taken from Chang, Gomes and Schorfheide (2002); as
noted above the constant γ is chosen so that the steady-state value of hours as a
fraction of the time endowment matches the average in the data.
Finally, the elasticity of substitution parameter σ was set equal to either −0.5 for
the case in which private consumption and public spending are substitutes (σs in the
table), or to 2.0 for the case in which they are complements (σc in the table). The
steady-state properties of the model are summarized in Table 2 below. The steady-
state level of average hours and the ratios of the components of different aggregates
to GNP reproduce their sample averages in U.S. data.
7Klein, Krusell and Rı´os-Rull (2004) solve for the steady state of a similar model by using only
steady-state information. They approximate the decision rules by taking successively higher-order
polynomial approximations and truncating the polynomials when the steady state changes by less
than some convergence criterion.
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4. Simulation Results
The model was used to simulate 1000 sequences of artificial series for output, public
spending, private consumption, private investment, the real rental rate, and the real
wage. Each series has a length of 300 periods. In each iteration, the first 100 obser-
vations were discarded to ensure that the results did not depend on initial conditions.
The number of remaining observations roughly corresponds to the sample size used
in empirical studies based on quarterly data.
Using the simulated series, we estimated a 4th-order VAR similar to those found in
the empirical literature.8 As Fata´s and Mihov (2001), Gal´ı, Lopez-Salido and Valle`s
(2007) and Bouakez and Rebei (2007), we identified government spending shocks by
imposing a causal ordering on the contemporaneous shocks using a diagonalization of
the variance-covariance matrix. More specifically, our identification scheme implies
that government spending shocks affect all the remaining variables contemporane-
ously, whereas shocks to these variables affect government spending only with a lag.9
In each iteration, we used these restrictions to compute the impulse response
functions to a 1 percent government spending shock. The responses, represented with
solid lines in Figures 1 through 4, are averages across the 1000 replications. Their
confidence intervals, delimited with dotted lines, were computed by excluding the 2.5
percent lowest and highest responses. Figures 1 and 2 show impulse response functions
for the case in which public spending is exogenous and public and private consumption
are, respectively, substitutes and complements. Figures 3 and 4 show impulse response
functions for a the case in which public spending is chosen optimally, as described
in section 2.6. Figure 3 depicts the case where private and public consumption are
substitutes, and Figure 4 the case where they are complements.
8We varied the lag length from 1 to 8 and found the results to be extremely robust.
9Blanchard and Perotti (2002) do not use a purely recursive identification strategy, but they
assume that government expenditures are predetermined relative to taxes.
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4.1 Exogenous public spending
We start by discussing the case where which public spending is purely exogenous.
When public and private expenditures are Edgeworth substitutes, the simulated im-
pulse response functions (shown in Figure 1) indicate what is expected from standard
RBC models: government spending crowds out private consumption.10 Intuitively,
the negative wealth effect induced by an increase in public spending is reinforced
by the substitutability between private and public consumption, leading households
to cut their consumption. As predicted by the RBC model, the increase in public
spending increases labor supply which in turn raises output and decreases the real
wage. It is worth noting that while the increase in hours worked and output are con-
sistent with the VAR-based evidence on the effects of government spending shocks,
the negative response of the real wage is not: Several empirical studies find that the
response of the real wage to an increase in public spending is positive albeit small.
In the case where private and public expenditures are strong complements (Figure
1), consumption increases following a government spending shock. As explained by
Bouakez and Rebei (2007), this result arises because the complementarity effect more
than offsets the negative wealth effect associated with an increase in public spending.
The rise in consumption, however, requires a larger increase in labor supply and there-
fore a greater decline in the real wage compared with the case where private and public
expenditures are substitutes (or are independent). Thus, while the complementarity
between private and public consumption helps to resolve the crowding-in puzzle, it
widens the discrepancy between the RBC model and the VAR-based evidence with
respect to the response of the real wage.
10For the case where public spending is truly exogenous, the theoretical impulse response functions
can also be derived. These give exactly the same answer as the impulse response function reported
and are therefore not reported separately.
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4.2 Optimal public spending
We now turn to the analysis of the simulated impulse response functions for the
model in which public spending is set optimally by the government. Starting with
the case where private and public expenditures are substitutes, Figure 3 shows that an
orthogonalized positive innovation to public spending generates a large and persistent
increase in private consumption. Interestingly, the consumption response has a hump-
shaped pattern, reaching its peak around 12 quarters after the shock, which accords
with much of the evidence reported in the empirical literature. The response of the
real wage is also positive (except on impact where it is negative but indistinguishable
from zero), as documented in earlier VAR-based studies.
We obtained very similar results, both qualitatively and quantitatively, when pri-
vate and public expenditures were assumed to be complements (Figure 4). In particu-
lar, there is a large, persistent and non-monotonic crowding-in effect on consumption.
In addition, the response of the real wage is positive at all horizons (even on impact).
To summarize, when public spending is set optimally, a VAR estimated using the
simulated series, and which identifies government spending shocks as is commonly
done in the literature, leads to the conclusion that public spending shocks crowd
in private consumption, regardless of whether private and public expenditures are
substitutes or complements. This is despite the fact that the data generating process
does not depart from the standard real business cycle model, except for the way
the government makes its decisions. Therefore, the conclusion that RBC models are
inconsistent with the data is unwarranted.
In order to gain some intuition about the mechanism that allows the model with
optimal public spending to generate a crowding-in effect, it is instructive to exam-
ine the theoretical response of private and public spending to the different (true)
structural shocks of the economy. Responses to technology and preference shocks are
depicted in Figure 5 and 6 respectively. Figures 5 shows that private consumption
and the two components of public spending (i.e., public consumption and invest-
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ment) increase in response to a technology shock. Private and public consumption
are responding optimally to the positive wealth effect of the technology shock. Public
investment responds optimally to the persistent increase in the marginal productivity
of public capital. On the other hand, a preference shock leads to a fall in private
and public spending. Private and public consumption optimally fall as private agents
place more weight on leisure. Private and public investment optimally fall as the
persistent decrease in hours lowers the marginal productivity of private and public
capital.
Overall, these results indicate that private and public spending tend to move to-
gether conditional on each of the structural shocks. In turn, this positive comovement
translates into a positive unconditional covariance between the two variables. When
the simulated data are used to estimate a VAR, the impulse response function of
consumption to an orthogonalized innovation in public spending is in fact picking up
this positive covariance.
5. Conclusion
We simulated a model in which public consumption and investment spending are
determined optimally by a government that seeks to maximize the welfare of a rep-
resentative private agent. We then used the simulated data to estimate a VAR using
identifying assumptions that are common in the empirical literature. We showed that
an orthogonalized innovation to public spending appears to cause a crowding in of
private consumption expenditure. This result holds when public and private con-
sumption are either substitutes or complements. Our results explain the empirical
finding that increases in public spending lead to increases in private consumption
expenditure. The explanation lies in the positive covariance of private and public
spending in response to exogenous shocks. The conclusion that the empirical evi-
dence undermines standard general equilibrium models of the business cycle follows
from a modeling approach that runs counter to the principle of treating all agents
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as optimizing well-defined objective functions subject to technological and budget
constraints.
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Table 1: Parameter Calibration
Parameter Value
α 0.640
αg 0.050
δ 0.021
δg 0.021
β 0.990
ψ 0.050
θ 0.693
σs -0.400
σc 2.000
z 1.000
ρz 0.950
σz 0.007
γ 0.622
ργ 0.940
σγ 0.0089
τn 0.197
τk 0.313
Table 2: Steady State
Variable Value
N 0.352
Y 1.312
C/Y 0.664
Cg/Y 0.169
I/Y 0.167
Ig 0.024
K/Y 7.951
Kg/Y 1.137
23
Figure 1: Simulated impulse responses to a 1 per cent increase in public spending: case with exogenous
public spending and substitutability between private and public expenditures.
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Figure 2: Simulated impulse responses to 1 per cent increase in public spending: case with exogenous
public spending and complementarity between private and public expenditures.
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Figure 3: Simulated impulse responses to 1 per cent increase in public spending: case with optimal public
spending and substitutability between private and public expenditures.
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Figure 4: Simulated impulse responses to 1 per cent increase in public spending: case with optimal public
spending and complementarity between private and public expenditures.
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Figure 5: Theoretical impulse responses to a 1 per cent technology shock.
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Figure 6: Theoretical impulse responses to a 1 per cent preference shock.
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